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ABSTRACT
Although a lot of correct and useful information is shared through channels such as Twitter, it has
also become a home ground for misinformation on COVID-19. To tackle this still ongoing infodemic,
scientific oversight as well as a better understanding by practitioners in crisis management is needed.
We have conducted an exploratory study into the propagation, authors and content of misinformation
on Twitter around the topic of COVID-19 in order to gain early insights into the COVID-19 infodemic.
Our results enable us to not only give first indications but also to suggest gaps in the current scientific
coverage of the topic. Moreover, we propose actions for authorities to counter misinformation and
hints for social media users on how to help stop the spread of misinformation.
1. Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic is currently spreading across
the world at an alarming rate [79]. It is considered by many
to be the defining global health crisis of our time [66]. As
WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus pro-
claimed at the Munich Security Conference on 15 February
2020, âĂĲWeâĂŹre not just fighting an epidemic; weâĂŹre
fighting an infodemicâĂİ. [82]. It has even been claimed
that the spread of COVID-19 is supported by misinforma-
tion [22]. The actions of individual citizens guided by the
quality of the information they have at hand is crucial to
the success of the global response to this health crisis. By
the 23 April 2020, the International Fact Checking Network
(IFCN) [54] uniting over 100 fact-checking organisations un-
earthed over 4 000 false claims regarding the pandemic. How-
ever, misinformation does not only contribute to the spread:
misinformation might bolster fear, drive societal disaccord,
or could even lead to direct damage – for example through in-
effective (or even directly harmful)medical advice or through
over- (e.g. hoarding) or underreaction (e.g. deliberately en-
gaging in risky behaviour) [50].
The misinformation is spreading rapidly on social me-
dia [82]. Similar trends were seen during other epidemics,
such as the Ebola [48], yellow fever [47] and Zika [45] out-
breaks. This is a worrying development as even a single ex-
posure to a piece of misinformation increases its perceived
accuracy [49]. In response to this infodemic, the WHO has
set up their own platform MythBusters that refutes misin-
formation [78] and is urging tech companies to battle fake
news on their platforms [7].1 Fact-checking organisations
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1At the same time, the WHO itself faces criticism regarding how it
have united under the IFCN to battle misinformation collab-
oratively, as individual fact-checkers like Snopes are being
overwhelmed [11].
There are many pressing questions in this uphill battle.
So far, four studies have investigated themagnitude or spread
of misinformation on Twitter regarding the COVID-19 pan-
demic [16, 33, 21, 62]. However, they either investigated a
very small subset of claims [62]; manually annotated a small
subset of Twitter data [33] or used the reliability of cited
sources to identify misinformation [21, 16]. In line with
Vosoughi et al. [77], we believe reliance on ‘reliable’ sources
is problematic, as the reliability of news sources is a subject
of considerable disagreement. In contrast, we use the ver-
dicts of professional fact-checking organisations whichman-
ually check each claim. Furthermore, none of the previous
studies have investigated how the language use of COVID-
19 misinformation differs from other COVID-19 tweets or
which Twitter accounts are associated with the spreading
of COVID-19 misinformation, although there have already
been some indications that bots might be involved [21, 19].
We thus conduct an exploratory analysis into (1) the Twit-
ter accounts behindCOVID-19misinformation, (2) the prop-
agation of COVID-19misinformation on Twitter, and (3) the
content of incorrect claims on COVID-19 that circulate on
Twitter. We decided to work exploratory because too little is
known about the topic at hand to tailor either a purely quan-
titative or a purely qualitative study.
The exploration of the phenomena with the aim of rapid
dissemination of results combined with the demand for aca-
demic rigour make our article somewhat uncommon in na-
ture. Nevertheless, our contributions are threefold: First,
we present a synthesis of social media analytics techniques
suitable for the analysis of the COVID-19 infodemic. We
believe this to be a starting point for a more structured, goal-
oriented approach to mitigate the crisis on the go – and to
learn how to decrease of negative effects from misinforma-
tion in future crisis as they unfold. Second, we contribute to
handles the crisis, among others regarding the dissemination of information
from member countries [71].
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the scientific theory with first insights into how COVID-19
misinformation differs from other COVID-19 related tweets,
who it originates from, and how it spreads.This should pose
the foundation for drawing a research agenda. Third, we pro-
vide a first set of recommendations for practice. They ought
to directly help social media managers of authorities, crisis
managers, and social media listeners in their work.
In Section 2we provide the academic context of our work
in the field of misinformation detection and propagation. In
Section 4 and 3, we elaborate on our data collection process
and methodology, respectively. We then present experimen-
tal result in Section 5, followed by discussing these results
and providing recommendations for organisations targeting
misinformation in Section 6. Finally, we draw a conclusion
in Section 7.
2. Background
In this section, we describe the background of misinfor-
mation, propagation of misinformation, rumours detection,
and the impact of fact-checking.
2.1. Defining misinformation
We define misinformation broadly as circulating infor-
mation that is false [84]. Commonly, it refers specifically to
accidentally false information or as a consequence of an hon-
est mistake, whereas disinformation refers to deliberately
false information [26]. In this study, we do not make claims
about the intent of the purveyors of information, whether ac-
cidental or malicious.
In reality, claims are not always completely false or true
but can be mostly false with elements of truth. Such claims
are coined partially false. Two examples in this category are:
images that are miscaptioned and claims omitting necessary
background information. In this article, we compare such
claims with completely false claims in order to attain better
insight into differences in their spread. We believe it may be
more challenging for users to recognise claims as false when
they contain elements of truth, as this has found to be the
case even for professional fact-checkers [37]. As such it is
crucial for fact-checking organisations and governments bat-
tling misinformation, to better understand how to sustain in-
formation sovereignty [41]. In an ideal setting, people would
always check facts and employ scientific methods. In a real-
istic setting, they would at least be mainly drawn to informa-
tion coming from fact-based sources who work ethically and
without a hidden agenda. Authorities such as cities ought to
be such sources [42].
2.2. Identifying rumours on Twitter
Rumours are “circulating pieces of information whose
veracity is yet to be determined at time of posting” [84].
Misinformation is essentially a false rumour that has been
debunked. Research on rumours is consequently closely re-
lated and the terms are often used interchangeably.
Rumours on social media can be identified through top-
down or bottom-up sampling [84]. A top-down strategy use
rumourswhich have already been identified and fact-checked
to find social media posts related to these rumours. This
has the disadvantage that rumours that have not been in-
cluded in the database are missed. Bottom-sampling strate-
gies have emerged more recently and is aimed at collect-
ing a wider range of rumours often prior to fact-checking.
This method was first employed by [85]. However, man-
ual annotation is necessary when using a bottom-up strat-
egy. Often journalists with expertise in verification are en-
listed since crowd-sourcing will lead to credibility percep-
tions rather than ground truth values. The exhaustive verifi-
cation may be beyond their expertise [84].
In this study we employ a top-down sampling strategy
relying on the work of on Snopes.com and over 100 differ-
ent fact-checking organisations organised under the Coro-
naVirusFacts/ DatosCoronaVirus alliance run by the Poyn-
ter Institute. We included all misinformation (see Section
3.2) around the topic of COVID-19 which include a Tweet
ID. A similar approach was used by Jiang et al. [29] with
Snopes.com and Politifact and by [77] using six independent
fact checking organisations.
2.3. Misinformation propagation
To what extent information goes viral is often modelled
using epidemiological models originally designed for bio-
logical viruses [23, 60]. The information is represented as
an ‘infectious agent’ that is spread from ‘infectives’ to ‘sus-
ceptibles’ with some probability. This method was also em-
ployed by [16] for the propagation of information to study
how infectious information onCOVID-19 is on Twitter. They
found that the basic reproductive number 푅0, i.e. the num-ber of infections due to one infected individual for a given
period, is between 4.0 to 5.1 on Twitter, indicating a high
level of ‘virality’ of COVID-19 information in general.2 Ad-
ditionally, they found the overall magnitude of COVID-19
misinformation on Twitter to be around 11%. They also in-
vestigated the relative amplification of reliable and unreli-
able information on Twitter and found it to be roughly equal.
Other researchers have modelled information propaga-
tion on Twitter using the retweet (RT) trees i.e. asking who
retweets whom? Various network metrics can then be ap-
plied to quantify the spread of information such as the depth
(number of retweets by unique users over time), size (number
of total users involved) or breadth (number of users involved
as a certain depth) [77]. These measures can also be consid-
ered over time to understand how propagation fluctuates.
An advantage of this approach is that unlike epidemio-
logical modelling it does not rely on the implicit assumption
that propagation is driven largely if not exclusively by peer-
to-peer spreading [23]. However, viral spreading is not the
only mechanism by which information can spread: Informa-
tion can also be spread by broadcasting, i.e. a large number
of individuals receive information directly from one source.
Goel et al. [23] introduced the measure of structural virality
to quantify to what extent propagation relies on both mech-
anisms.
2This, curiously, means that misinformation on the new coronavirus
has a higher infectivity than the virus itself [39, 83].
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2.4. The impact of fact-checking
Previous research on the efficacy of fact-checking reveals
the corrections often do not have the desired effect and mis-
information resists debunking. Although the likelihood of
sharing does appear to drop after a fact-checker adds a com-
ment revealing this information to be false, this effect does
not seem to persist on the long run [20]. In fact, 51.9% of the
re-shares of false rumours occur after this debunking com-
ment. This may in part be due to readers not reading all
the comments before re-sharing. Complete retractions of the
misinformation are also generally ineffective, despite peo-
ple believing, understanding and remembering the retrac-
tion [35]. Social reactance [8] may also play a role here:
people do not like being told what to think and may reject
authoritative retractions.Three factors that do increase their
effectiveness are (a) repetition, (b) warnings at the initial ex-
posure and (c) corrections that tell an alternate story that
does not leave behind an unexplained gap [35].
Twitter users also engage in debunking rumours. Over-
all, research supports the idea that the Twitter community
debunks inaccurate information through self-correction [84,
43]. However, self-correction can be slow to take effect [55]
and it appears that in the earlier stages of a rumour circulat-
ing Twitter users have problems differentiating between true
and false rumours [85]. This includes users of high repu-
tation such as news organisations who may issue corrective
statements at a later date if necessary. This underscores the
necessity of dealing with newly emerging rumours around
crises like the outbreak of COVID-19.
Yet, these corrections also do not always have the de-
sired effect. Fact-checking corrections are most likely to be
tweeted by strangers, but are more likely to draw user atten-
tion and responses when they come from friends [24]. Al-
though such corrections do elicit more responses from users
containing words referring to facts, deceit (e.g. fake) and
doubt, there is an increase in the number of swearwords [29],
too. Thus, on the one hand, users appear to understand and
possibly believe the rumour is false. On the other hand,
swearing likely indicates backfire [29]: an increase in nega-
tive emotion is symptomatic of individuals clinging to their
own worldview and false beliefs. Thus, corrections have
mixed effects that may depend in part on who is issuing the
correction.
3. Data collection & preprocessing
In this section, we describe the steps involved in the data
collection and filtering the tweets for analysis. We have used
two datasets for our study. First one is the Tweet which has
beenmentioned by fact-checker and classified as false or par-
tially false and the second dataset of COVID-19 tweets col-
lected from Kaggle.
3.1. Data collection
First we have collected the list of fact checked news ar-
ticles related to the COVID-19 from Snopes [64] and Poyn-
ter [53] from 01-14-2020 to 23-04-2020. We collected 4 468
fact checked articles from Snopes and Poynter. We used
Beautifulsoup [57] to crawl the content of the news articles
and prepared a list of news articles which collected the in-
formation like title, content of the news article, fact checker
company, location, category (e.g. False, Partially False) of
fact checked claims. An overall workflow for fetching tweets
mentioned in the articles on fact checked claims is shown in
Figure 1.
Twitter data from Fact-chekers To find the misleading
posts on COVID-19 on Twiter, we crawled the content of
the news article using Beautifulsoup and looked for the arti-
cle, which is referring to Twitter. In the HTML DOM (Doc-
ument Object Model), we looked for all anchor tags <a>
which defines a hyperlink. We filter the anchor tag which
contains keyword ‘twitter’ and ‘status’ because each Tweet
message is linked with the URL (Uniform Resource Loca-
tor) in the form of https://twitter.com/statuses/ID. From
the collected URL, we fetched the ID, where the ID is the
unique identifier for each Tweet. We fetched 473 Tweet IDs
from 4468 news articles.
Tweet From the Tweet ID generated in the above step, we
used tweepy [58], a python library for accessing the Twitter
API. Using the library, we fetched the Tweet and its descrip-
tion like created_at, like, screen name, description, followers
etc.
Retweets To analyse the propagation of misinformation on
the twitter, we fetched the all the retweet using the python
library Twarc[68]. Twarc is a command-line tool for collect-
ing Twitter data in JSON3 format. We gathered the retweet
from using the Tweet ID gathered in the above step. Dur-
ing the limitation of the Twitter developer account, we could
collect the retweet from last seven days.
User account details From the Twitter API, we also gath-
ered the account information like, Favourites count(number
of likes gained), friends count(number of accounts followed
by the user), follower count(number of followers this ac-
count currently has.), account age(number of days from ac-
count creation date to 31-12-2020, the time when discussion
about COVID-19 started around the world), profile descrip-
tion, user location. We used these information classifying
the popular account, bot detection.
3.2. Defining classes for misinformation
Discounting differences in capitalisation, our data orig-
inally contained 21 different verdict classes provided by the
fact-checking organisations i.e. Snopes and over 100 dif-
ferent organisations in the International Fact Checking Net-
work. We provide class definition in Table 1 an overview
of news category that were included or not included in our
study along with a categorisation by us and the original and
more granular categorisation by fact checkers. Since each
fact-checking organisation has its own set of verdicts (e.g.
False) that it gives to claims and these have not been nor-
malised by Poynter, manual normalisation is necessary. Fol-
3https://www.json.org/
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Figure 1: Illustration of data collection using the interaction between social media and
fact-checking website (screenshots from [28, 18])
lowing the practice of [77], we normalised verdicts by man-
ually mapping them to a score of 1 to 5 (1=‘False’, 2=‘Par-
tially False’, 3=‘Mixture’, 4=‘Mostly True’, 5=‘True’) based
on the definitions provided by the fact-checking organisa-
tions. As we are specifically interested in misinformation,
we excluded claims with a score of 3 or lower i.e, consid-
ered only false and partially false category. We also excluded
claims with verdicts that did not conform to this scale, e.g.
sarcasm, unproven claims and disputed claims. From 473
tweets collected, 443 are used for our study – 372 false and
71 partially false. The data used in our work is available
through GitHub4.
3.3. Examples of misinformation
We randomly took 2 Examples of misinformation in the
false and partially false category which are shown in figure
2 and figure 3 respectively. There was a rumour that Costco
had issued a recall of their bath tissues in the fear that the
tissues might contain Covid-19. In the first Tweet[46] a user
posted a video related to the fake news of toilet paper. The
author states that people were running to the store to buy
and then return the toilet papers due to the news. Later the
claim was fact-checked by Snopes and it was found that the
claim wa false and that Costco had not announced any such
recall[65]. There were several other similar fake news re-
garding similar claims.
The second Tweet [6] was posted by the news company,
ANI that people quarantined from Tablighi Jamaat[4] mis-
behaved with the health workers and police staff. They are
not following the rules of the quarantine centre. AFP checks
[1] it and found that the claim is partially false, and the video
used in the claim was used from an incident in Mumbai dur-
ing February 2020. Different Twitter handles circulated this
4https://github.com/Gautamshahi/Misinormation_COVID-19
misinformation. Both claims were retweeted and liked by
several users on Twitter.
3.4. Background corpus of COVID-19 Tweets
In order to understand how the misinformation around
COVID-19 is distinct from the other tweets on this topic, we
made use of a background corpus of all English COVID-19
tweets on the 15th of April 2020 [63].
It includes tweets with the following hashtags on that
day: #coronavirus, #coronavirusoutbreak, #coronavirusPan-
demic, #covid19, #covid_19, #epitwitter and #ihavecorona.
The total size of the dataset is 264 893 tweets.
3.5. Preprocessing of Tweets
Originally, the data contained 26 known languages (ac-
cording to Twitter – see Figure 4). We use the Google Trans-
late API5 to automatically detect the correct language and
translate to English. Hereafter, tweets were lowercased and
tokenized usingNLTK[40]. Emojis were identified using the
emoji package [31] and were removed for subsequent anal-
yses. Mentions and URLs were also removed using regular
expressions. Hashtags were not removed, as they are often
used by twitter users to convey essential information. Addi-
tionally, sometimes they are used to replace regular words in
the sentence (e.g. ‘I was tested for #corona’) and thus omit-
ting them would remove essential words from the sentence.
Therefore, we only remove the # symbol from the hashtags.
4. Method
In this section, we present our method for analysis and
illustration of the extracted data. We follow a two-way ap-
proach. In the first, we analyse the details of the user ac-
5https://cloud.google.com/translate/docs
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Table 1
Manual re-categorisation of claims compared to original categorisation by the fact checking
web sites
Included
(y/n)
Our rating Fact-checker
rating
Definition given by fact-checker
y False False The checkable claims are all false.
y Mostly false Miscaptioned This rating is used with photographs and videos that are âĂĲrealâĂİ (i.e., not
the product, partially or wholly, of digital manipulation) but are nonetheless
misleading because they are accompanied by explanatory material that falsely
describes their origin, context, and/or meaning.
y Mostly false Misleading Offers an incorrect impression on some aspect(s) of the science, leaves the
reader with false understanding of how things work, for instance by omitting
necessary background context.
n - Unproven This rating indicates that insufficient evidence exists to establish the given claim
as true, but the claim cannot be definitively proved false. This rating typically
involves claims for which there is little or no affirmative evidence, but for which
declaring them to be false would require the difficult (if not impossible) task
of our being able to prove a negative or accurately discern someone elseâĂŹs
thoughts and motivations.
y Mostly false Partially false [Translated] Some claims appear to be correct, but some claims can not be
supported by evidence.
y False Pants on fire The statement is not accurate and makes a ridiculous claim.
n - News [definition not provided]
y Mostly false Mostly false Mostly false with one minor element of truth.
y Mostly false Partly false Partly False, Missing Context.
n - True This rating indicates that the primary elements of a claim are demonstrably
true.
n - Labeled Satire This rating indicates that a claim is derived from content described by its
creator and/or the wider audience as satire. Not all content described by its
creator or audience as âĂŸsatireâĂŹ necessarily constitutes satire, and this
rating does not make a distinction between ’real’ satire and content that may
not be effectively recognized or understood as satire despite being labeled as
such.
n - Explanatory "Explanatory" is not a rating for a checked article, but an explanation of a fact
on its own
n - Mixture This rating indicates that a claim has significant elements of both truth and
falsity to it such that it could not fairly be described by any other rating.
n - Mostly true Mostly accurate, but there is a minor error or problem.
n - Half true The statement is partially accurate but leaves out important details or takes
things out of context.
y Mostly false Two pinocchios Significant omissions and/or exaggerations. Some factual error may be involved
but not necessarily. A politician can create a false, misleading impression by
playing with words and using legalistic language that means little to ordinary
people. (Similar to "half true.")
y Mostly false Misattributed This rating indicates that quoted material (speech or text) has been incorrectly
attributed to a person who didn’t speak or write it.
n - In dispute One can see the dueling narratives here, neither entirely incorrect. For that
reason, we will leave this unrated.
n - No evidence [Translated] A claim is not based on any reliable evidence.
y False Fake [Rewritten generalized] Claims of an article are untrue
n - (No rating)
counts involved in the spread of misinformation and prop-
agation of misinformation (false or partially false data). In
the second, we analyse the content. With both we investigate
the propagation of misinformation on social media.
4.1. Account categorisation
In order to gain a better understanding of who is spread-
ing misinformation on Twitter, we investigated the Twitter
accounts behind the tweets. First, we analyse the role of bots
in spreading misinformation by using a bot detection API to
automatically classify the accounts of authors. Similarly, we
analyse whether accounts are brands using an available clas-
sifier. Third, we investigate some some characteristics of the
accounts that reflect their popularity (e.g. follower count).
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Figure 2: Misinformation of false category
Figure 3: Misinformation of partially false category
Figure 4: The language distribution prior to translation
4.1.1. Bot detection
A Twitter bot is a type of bot program which operate
a Twitter account via the Twitter API. The pre-programmed
bot autonomously performs somework such as tweeting, un-
following, re-tweeting, liking, following or direct messaging
other accounts. Shao et al. [61] discussed the role of so-
cial bots in spreading the misininformation. Previous stud-
ies show there are several types of bots are involved in so-
cial media such as "newsbots", "spambots", "malicious bot".
Sometimes, newsbots or malicious bots are trained to spread
the misinformation. Caldarelli et al. [12] discuss the role of
bots in Twitter propaganda. To analyse the role of bots, we
used the examine each account with a bot detection API [17].
4.1.2. Type of account (brand or non-brand)
Social media, such as microblogging websites, used for
sharing information and gathering opinion on the treading
topic. Social media has different types of user, organisa-
tion, celebrity or an ordinary user. We consider organisa-
tion, celebrity as a brand which has a big number of follow-
ers and catches more attention public attention. The brand
uses a more professional way of communication, gets more
user attention[67] and have high reachability due to bigger
follower network and retweet count. With a large network,
a piece of false or partially false information spread faster
compared to a normal account. We classify the account as
a brand or normal users using a modified of TwiRole [36]
a python library. We use profile name, picture, latest Tweet
and account description to classify the account.
4.1.3. Popularity of account
Popular accounts get more attention from users, so we
analyse the popularity of the account; we considered the
parameter number of followers, verified account. Twitter
gives an option to "following" a user can follow another user
by clicking the follow button, and it becomes the followers.
When a Tweet is posted on Twitter, then it is visible to all
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of his/her followers. Twitter verifies the account, and after
doing a verification, Twitter provides the user to receive a
blue checkmark badge next to your name. From 2017 the
service is paused by Twitter, and it’s limited to only a few
accounts chosen by the Twitter developer. Hence, the veri-
fied account is a kind of authentic account. We investigate
several characteristics that are associated with popular ac-
counts, namely: Favourites count, follower count, account
age and verified status. If a popular user spread false or par-
tially false news, then it is more likely to attract more atten-
tion from other users compared to the non-popular twitter
handle.
4.2. Information diffusion
To investigate the diffusion of misinformation on Twit-
ter, we explore the timeline of retweets and calculate the
speed of retweets as a proxy for the speed of propagation.
A retweet is a re-posting of a Tweet, which a Twitter user
can do with or without an additional comment. Twitter even
provides a retweet feature to share the Tweet with your fol-
lower network quickly.For our analysis, We only considered
the retweet of Tweet.
Propagation of misinformation We define the average
speed of propagation of Tweet as the total number of retweet
done for a Tweet divided by the total number of days the
Tweet is getting retweets. The formula to calculate the prop-
agation speed is defined in equation 1.
푃푠 =
∑푑
푛=1 푟푐
푁푑
(1)
Where Ps is the propagation speed, rc is retweet countper day and Nd is the total number of days.We calculated the speed of propagation over three differ-
ent periods. The first metric Ps_a is the average overall prop-agation speed: the speed of retweets from the 1st retweet to
the last retweet of a Tweet. The second metric is the propa-
gation speed during the peak time of the Tweet, denoted by
Ps_pt. After a time being, the Tweet does not get any retweet,but again some days again start getting user attention and
retweet. So, We define the peak time of the Tweet as the
time (in days) from the retweet start till retweet goes to zero
for the first time. The third metric Ps_pcv is the propagationspeed calculated during the peak time of crisis, i.e., from
15-03-2020 to 15-04-2020. We decided the peak time ac-
cording to the timeline propagation of retweets, as shown in
5, which is maximum during the mid-March and mid-April.
4.3. Content analysis
In order to attain a better understanding of whatmisinfor-
mation around the topic of COVID-19 is circulating on Twit-
ter, we investigate the content of the tweets. Due to the rel-
atively small number of partially false claims, we combined
the data for these analyses. First, we analyse the most com-
mon hashtags and emojis. Second, we investigate the most
distinctive terms in our data to gain a better understanding of
how COVID-19 misinformation differs from other COVID-
19 related content on Twitter. To this end, we compare our
data to a background corpus of all English COVID-19 tweets
on 15/04 (See Section 3.4). This enables us to find the most
distinctive phrases in our corpus: Which topics are discussed
in misinformation that are not discussed in other COVID-19
related tweets? These topics may be of special interest, as
there may be little correct information to balance the misin-
formation circulating on these topics. Third, we make use of
the language used in the circulating misinformation to gauge
the emotions and underlying psychological factors authors
display in their tweets. The latter may be able to give us
a first insight into why they are spreading this information.
Again the prevalence of emotional and psychological fac-
tors is compared to their prevalence in a background corpus
in order to uncover how false tweets differ from the general
chatter on COVID-19.
4.3.1. Hashtags and emojis
Hashtags are brief keywords or abbreviations prefixed by
a # that are used on social media platforms to make tweets
more easily searchable [10]. Hashtags can be considered
self-reported topics that the author believes his or her tweet
links to. Emoji are standardised pictographs originally de-
signed to convey emotion between participants in text-based
conversation [30]. Emojis can thus be considered a proxy
for self-reported emotions by the author of the tweet.
We analyse the top 10 hashtags by combining all terms
prefixed by a #. For # symbols that are stand-alone we take
the next unigram to be the hashtag. We identify emojis using
the package emoji [31]
4.3.2. Analysis of distinctive terms
To investigate the most distinctive terms in our data, we
used the pointwise Kullback Leibner divergence for Infor-
mativeness and Phraseness (KLIP) [72] as presented in [76]
6 for unigrams, bigrams and trigrams. KullbackâĂŞLeibler
divergence is a measure from information theory that esti-
mates the difference between two probability distributions.
The informativeness component (KLI) of KLIP compares
the probability distribution of the background corpus to that
of the candidate corpus to estimate the expected loss of infor-
mation for each term. The terms with the largest loss are the
most informative. The phraseness component (KLP) com-
pares the probability distribution of a candidate multi-word
term to the distributions of the single words it contains. The
terms for which the expected loss of information is largest
are those that are the strongest phrases. We set the parame-
ter 훾 to 0.8 as recommended for English text. 훾 determines
the relative weight of the informativeness component KLI
versus the phraseness component KLP.
4.3.3. Analysis of emotional and psychological
processes
The emotional and psychological processes of authors
can be studied by investigating their language use. A well-
6https://github.com/suzanv/termprofiling
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known method to do so is the Linguistic Inquiry and Word
Count (LIWC)method [69]. Wemade use of the LIWC2015
version and focused on the categories: Emotions, Social Pro-
cesses, Cognitive Processes, Drives, Time, Personal Con-
cerns and Informal Language. In short, the LIWC counts
the relative frequency of words relating to these categories
based on manually curated word lists. All statistical compar-
isons were done with Mann-Whitney U tests.
5. Results
This section describes the result obtained from our anal-
ysis for both 443 tweets, which classified as misinformation
and 264 893 COVID-19 tweets.
5.1. Account categorisation
From 443 tweets, we filter 375 unique accounts and per-
formed categorisation of account using method mentioned
in Section 4.1. The summary of the result obtained is shown
in Table 2.
Bot detection From BotoMeter API, we use the Complete
Automation Probability(CAP) score to classify the bot. CAP
is the probability of the account being a bot according to
the model used in the API. We choose the CAP score of
more than 0.67. We discovered that there are 6 bot accounts
out 372 user accounts; user IDs 1025102081265360896 and
1180933034423529473 for instance are classified as bots.
Brand detection For Brand detection, we used the Twi-
Role API, then categorised the accounts as a brand which
has classification score more than of 62% to decode role of
the account because we performed a random check and all
account which has 62% prediction rate was classified cor-
rectly. We have got 154 accounts as a brand. For instance,
user ID 18815507 is an organisation account while user ID
621533 is a representative of the UNICEF.
Popularity of account For measuring the popularity, we
gathered the information about favourite counts gained by
the accounts, followers count, friends accounts, and the age
of the accounts using the Twitter API. We represented the
median of Favourite Count, account age and followers count,
as shown in Table 2.
5.2. Information diffusion
In this section, we describe the propagation of misinfor-
mation with timeline analysis and speed of propagation.
Timeline of Retweet In figure 5, we presented our result
from January to April, one plot for each different month from
January to April 2020. The blue colour indicates the propa-
gation of false category, and orange colour indicates the par-
tially false category. We calculated the number of retweets
done in 3 hours for both false and partially false category.
We plotted the number of retweets for each day from 20-
01-2020 to 25-04-2020. We choose 3 hours duration to ad-
just the count for plotting false and partially false category.
Table 2
Account characteristics
False Partially False Overall
Number of Tweets 372 71 443
Unique Account 316 59 375
Verified Account 150 29 179
Distinct Language 24 14 26
Organisation/Celebrity 129 25 154
Bot Account 6 0 6
Account Suspended 3 0 3
Tweet without Hashtags 280 54 334
Median Retweet Count 128 48 123
Median Favourite Count 190 74 161
Median Followers Count 23,469 27,311 23.502
Median Friends Count 476 675 482
Median Account Age(days) 2,676 3,111 2,746
The timeline analysis of retweet shows that the propagation
of misinformation(false category) is faster than the partially
false category and spreading of misinformation was more
during mid-March to mid-April 2020. The spread of misin-
formation was at a peak from 16th to 23rd March 2020. The
time when COVID-19 was spread across the globe.
The median count of total number retweet of the false
and partially false category tweets are 128 and 48, respec-
tively. The Tweet of false category gets more retweets or
likes compare to the partially false, which concludes the reach-
ability of fake news is more to the users.
Propagation of misinformation We calculated the three
variant of propagation speed of tweet as discussed in section
4.2. Results for Ps_a, Ps_pt and Ps_pcv are describe in table3. We have observed that the speed of propagation is higher
for the false category and it was the highest during the peak
time of Tweet (time duration from the beginning to the day
Tweet not getting new retweet).
We performed a chi-square test on the propagation speed
shown in table 3. The analysis showed that there is a differ-
ence in the speed of propagation in tweets, between false and
partially false by performing (X2 (3, N = 443) = 10.23, p
<.001). In particular, the propagation speed was maximum
during the peak time of the Tweet.
Table 3
Propagation speed of retweet
False(휎) Partially False(휎) Overall(휎)
Ps_a 245(17.6) 220(7.5) 209(11.6)
Ps_pt 542(24.6) 344(17.6) 376(20.9)
Ps_pcv 398(16.4) 257(8.7) 229(13.2)
5.3. Content analysis
This section discusses the result obtained after doing the
content analysis of tweets discussing false and partially false
claims.
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Figure 5: Frequency distribution of retweet for false (blue) and
partially false (orange) claims
5.3.1. Hashtag & emoji analysis
Hashtag analysis As can be seen in Figure 6, many of
the most commonly used hashtags in COVID-19 misinfor-
mation concerns the corona virus itself (i.e. #coronavirus,
#corona, #covid19, #cov19, and #ncov2019). Since we did
not use any hashtags in the data collection of our corpus of
COVID-19 misinformation (See Section 3.1), this confirms
that our method managed to capture misinformation related
to the corona crisis. Additionally, the hashtag #fakenews
stands out: the term fake news is widely used to refer to in-
accurate information [84] or more specifically to “fabricated
information that mimics news media content in form but not
in organisational process or intent” [34]. Thus, it appears
that some authors are discrediting information spread by oth-
ers. Yet, we are unable to determine based on this analysis
who they are discrediting. Furthermore, two locations can
be discerned from the hashtags: Both Spain and Qom, the
first city of Iran to have corona infections, seems to be con-
nected to COVID-19 misinformation. Another topic that is
reflected in the hashtags is Event 201 (#event201). Event
201 was a pandemic exercise on October 18, 2019, in New
York, NY run by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Se-
curity in partnership with the World Economic Forum and
# coronavirus
# covid19
# corona
# fakenews
# cov19
# ncov2019
# spain
# krvnadrqm
# event201
# aplausosolidario
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Figure 6: Top 10 hashtags *translates to ‘Corona in Qom’
(Persian) **translates to solidarity applause (Spanish)
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Figure 7: Top 10 em jis
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation [25]. This event is
known to be used as evidence to claim that Bill and Melinda
Gates predicted or profited from the coronavirus [52]. Lastly,
it appears that some claims concern public applauding of
Spanish health careworkers (#aplausosolidario). These tweets
are partially false and are accompanied by videos of the po-
lice of Madrid applauding health care workers.
Emoji analysis Emojis are used on Twitter to convey emo-
tions. We analysed the most prevalent emojis used by au-
thors of COVID-19 misinformation on Twitter (see Figure
7). It appears authors make use of emojis to attract atten-
tion to their claim (loudspeaker) and to convey distrust or
dislike (down-wards arrow) or danger (warning sign, police
light). Also emojis relating to certain countries (i.e. United
States and India) are popular. Moreover, authors use emo-
jis to direct attention towards URLs (pointing finger). The
Shahi et al.: Preprint submitted to Elsevier Page 9 of 17
COVID-19 Misinformation on Twitter
party emojis do not appear to be used sarcastically but in
reference to actual parties (e.g. ‘Carnival in Bahia - WHO
WILL ? -URL-’ which refers to a video showing Carnival in
Bahia but of which some claim it shows a gay party in Italy
shortly before the COVID-19 outbreak [2]).
5.3.2. Most distinctive terms in COVID-19
misinformation
Analysing the most distinctive terms in our corpus com-
pared to a corpus of general COVID-19 tweets can reveal
which topics are most unique. The more unique a topic is to
the misinformation corpus, the more likely it is that for this
topic there is a larger amount of misinformation than correct
information circulating on Twitter.
We can see in Table 4 which phrases have the highest
KLIP score and thus are most distinct when we compare
our corpus to the background corpus of COVID-19 tweets.
First, we find that tweets about the amount of corona cases
are distinct to this corpus (‘infected person’, ‘new confirmed
cases’, ‘cases confirm coronavirus’, ‘tested positive’, ‘new
cases’). Second, compared to general COVID-19 tweets,
misinformation more often concerns discrediting informa-
tion circulating on social media (‘fake news’ ‘circulating on
social media’ ‘social media’). An example for this is the
following tweet: ‘Messages being circulated on social me-
dia as WHO protocol for lockdown are baseless and FAKE.
WHO does NOT have anyâĂę -URL-’. Third, information
about corona in (certain cities of) Colombia (‘colombia pa-
tients’, ‘bogota medellin’) is distinct to our corpus of misin-
formation e.g. ‘6 new cases confirm coronavirus in colom-
bia . patients are in bogota, medellin and rionegro’. Lastly,
other phrases that more common in our corpus than in gen-
eral COVID-19 tweets are: ‘interferon alpha’ which refers
to the alleged claim that Cuba is using interferon alpha as an
effective medication against the corona virus; ‘aerosol infec-
tion ’which concernswhether corona is airborne; ‘kibundani
kwale’ which refers to an alleged incident in Kenya of youth
beating up a corona patient, and ‘bicentennial bank’ which
refers to the rumours surrounding images of a robbery of this
bank in Venezuela by bandits [13].
5.3.3. Psycho-linguistic analysis
To investigate the emotions and psychological processes
displayed by authors in their tweets we use the LIWC to es-
timate the relative frequency of words relating to each cate-
gory [69]. LIWC is a good proxy for measuring emotions in
tweets: In a recent study of emotional responses to COVID-
19 on Twitter, Kleinberg et al. [32] found that the measures
of the LIWC correlate well with self-reported emotional re-
sponses to COVID-19.
We first compared themisinformation onCOVID-19with
a background corpus of tweets on COVID-19. Emotions
such as anger, happiness, sadness did not appear to differ
(Figure 8). Both positive and negative emotions are sig-
nificantly less prevalent (푝 < 0.001 and 푝 = 0.002 resp.)
in tweets with COVID-19 misinformation than in COVID-
19 related tweets in general. This is also the case for spe-
Table 4
Top 20 most informative terms in misinformation tweets com-
pared to COVID-19 background corpus
Term KLIP score
corona virus 0.004
circulating on social 0.004
fake news 0.0034
social media 0.0033
bicentennial bank 0.0025
new cases confirm 0.0024
aerosol infection 0.0024
tested positive 0.0024
novel coronavirus 0.0023
new cases 0.0022
colombia patients 0.0022
coronavirus covid-19 0.0022
cases confirm coronavirus 0.0022
covid-19 in colombia 0.0020
new confirmed cases 0.0020
social networks 0.0020
infected person 0.0019
kibundani kwale 0.0018
interferon alpha 0.0018
bogota medellin 0.0018
cific negative emotions, namely anger (푝 = 0.002), anxi-
ety (푝 = 0.01) and sadness (푝 < 0.001). Tweets on misin-
formation are also significantly less likely to discuss family
(푝 = 0.007) but not less likely to discuss friends.
When we consider cognitive processes that can be dis-
cerned from language use, we see that tweets containingmis-
information are significantly less tentative in what they say
(푝 < 0.001). They use significantly more language reflect-
ing certainty (푝 = 0.001). They also give less explana-
tory reasons or causes (e.g. words like because, hence)(푝 <
0.001), and contain less words relating to discrepancy be-
tween present (i.e what is now) and what could be (i.e. what
would, should or could be) (푝 < 0.001). Yet, tweets with
misinformation use more language that reflects differentia-
tion (words like but or else) (푝 = 0.03). In this context, this
might reflect a differentiation from what others (e.g. tradi-
tional media) say.
Overall, tweets containingCOVID-19misinformation are
less likely to refer to what drives the authors than COVID-
19 tweets in general (푝 < 0.001). All drives except risk i.e.
affiliations to others, reward, achievements, and power are
significantly less likely to occur (푝 < 0.001). Yet, words re-
lating to risk (e.g. danger) are more frequent (푝 = 0.003).
Thus, authors posting misinformation appear to be signif-
icantly more driven by their concerns or preventing others
from coming to harm. Misinformation is also less likely to
discuss personal concerns, such as work, leisure and money
(all 푝 < 0.001) but also death (푝 = 0.015). The only per-
sonal concern that was not significantly less prevalent was
religion.
Further, COVID-19 tweets appear to have a particularly
focus on the present. COVID-19 misinformation seems to
also focus on the present but to a significantly lesser degree
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Figure 8: LIWC results comparing COVID-19 background corpus to COVID-19 misinfor-
mation
(푝 < 0.001), whereas the focus on past or future does not
differ. Lastly, although both corpora are from Twitter, the
COVID-19 tweets containing misinformation use relatively
more informal language with more so-called netspeak (e.g.
lol and thx) (푝 < 0.001) and assent (e.g. OK) (푝 < 0.001), al-
though significantly less swear words were used (푝 = 0.03).
6. Discussion
Based on our analysis, we discuss our findings. We first
look at lessons learned from using Twitter in an ongoing cri-
sis before deriving recommendations for practice. We then
scrutinise limitations of our work, which form the basis for
our summary of open questions.
6.1. Lessons learned
While conducting this research, we encountered a num-
ber of issues concerning the use of Twitter data to monitor
misinformation in an ongoing crisis. We wanted to point
these out in order to stimulate a discussion on these topics
within the scientific community.
The first issue is that the Twitter API severely limits the
extent to which the reaction to and propagation of misinfor-
mation can be researched after the fact. One of the major
challenges with collecting Twitter data is the fact that the
Twitter API does not allow for retrieval of tweet replies over
7 days old and limits the retrieval of retweets. As it typi-
cally takes far longer for a fact-checking organisation to ver-
ify or discount a claim, this means early replies cannot be
retrieved in order to gauge the public reaction before fact-
checking. Recently, Twitter has created a endpoint specifi-
cally for retrieving COVID-19 related tweets in real-time for
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researchers [73]. Although we welcome this development,
this does not solve the issue at hand. Although large data
sets of COVID-19 Twitter data are increasingly being made
publicly available [14], as far as we are aware, these do not
include replies or retweets either.
The second issue is that there is an inherent tension be-
tween the speed at which data analysis can be done to aid
practitioners combating misinformation and the magnitude
of Twitter data that can be included. In a crisis where speed
is of the essence, this is not trivial. Our data was limited by
the number of claims that included a tweet (for more on data
limitations see Section 6.3), causing a loss of around 90% of
the claims we collected from fact-checking websites. This
problem could be mitigated to some extent by employing
similarity matching to map misinformation verified by fact-
checking organisations to tweets in COVID-19 Twitter data
[14]. However, this would be computationally intensive and
require the creation of a reliable matching algorithm, mak-
ing this approach far slower. Moreover, automatic methods
for creating larger data sets will also lead to more noisy data.
Thus, such an approach should rather been seen as comple-
mentary to our own. Probably, social media analytics sup-
port can draw from lessons learned on crisis management
decision making under deep uncertainty [56]. Eventually,
more work and a a scientific debate on this topic is neces-
sary. Additionally, as an academic community it is impor-
tant to explicitly conveywhat can andwhat cannot be learned
from the data so as to prevent practitioners from drawing un-
founded conclusions. The other way around, we deem it nec-
essary to “look over the shoulder” over practitioners to learn
about their way of handling the dynamics of social media,
eventually leading to a better theory.
A third point that must be considered by the academic
community researching this subject is the risk of profiling
Twitter users. There have been indications that certain user
characteristics such as gender [15] and affiliation with the
alt-right community [70] may be related to the likelihood
of spreading misinformation. Systematic analyses of these
characteristics could prove valuable to practitioners battling
this infodemic but simultaneously raises serious concerns re-
lated to discrimination. In this article, we did not analyse
such characteristics but we urge the scientific community to
consider how this could be done in an ethical manner. Better
understanding which kind of people create, share and suc-
cumb to misinformation would much help mitigating their
negative influence.
Fourth, relying on automatic detection on fact checked
articles can lead to false results. The method used by fact
checkers is often confusing and messyâĂŤ it is a muddle of
claims, news articles and social media posts. Additionally,
each fact checker appears to have its own process of debunk-
ing and set of verdicts. We even encountered cases where
fact checkers discuss multiple claims in one go, resulting in
additional confusion. Moreover, fact checkers do not always
explicitly specify the final verdict or class (false or not) of
the claim. For example, in a fact check performed by Pesa
Check [51] the claim "Chinese woman was killed in Mom-
basa over COVID-19 fears" is described and the article links
various news sources. Then, abruptly in the bottom, a tweet
message about a mob lynching of a man is embedded and
no specification of the class (false or not) of the article is
mentioned.
6.2. Recommendations
Research on topic that relate to crisis management of-
fer the chance to not only contribute to the scientific body
of knowledge but directly (back) to the field. Our findings
allow us to draw a first set of recommendations for public
authorities and others with an official role in crisis commu-
nication. Ultimately, these also could be helpful for all crit-
ical users of social media, and especially those who seek to
debunk misinformation.
First, and rather unsurprisingly, closely watching social
media is recommended (cf. e.g. with [3, 80, 75]). COVID-
19 has sparked much misinformation, and it quickly propa-
gates. Our work indicates that this is not an ephemeral phe-
nomenon. For the john doe user, our findings suggest to al-
ways be critical, even if alleged sources are given, and even
if Tweets are rather old or make reference of old Tweets.
Second, our results serves as a proof that brands (organ-
isations or celebrities) are involved in approximately 35%
of false category and partially false category of misinfor-
mation. They either create or circulate misinformation by
performing activities such as liking or retweeting. This is
in line with work by researchers from the Queensland Uni-
versity of Technology who also found that celebrities are
so-called “super-spreaders” of misinformation in the current
crisis [9]. Thus, we recommend close monitoring of celebri-
ties and organisations that have been found to spread misin-
formation in order to catch misinformation at an early stage.
For users, this means that they should be cautious, even if a
Tweet comes from their favourite celebrity.
Third, we recommend close monitoring of tags such as
#fakenews that are routinely associatedwithmisinformation.
For Twitter users this also means that they have chances to
check if a Tweetmight bemisinformation by checking replies
to it – these replies being tagged with for instance #fakenews
would be an indicator of suspicion 7.
Fourth, we advise to particularly study news that are par-
tially false – despite an observed slower propagation it might
be more dangerous to those not routinely resorting to in-
formation that provides a desired reality rather than facts.
As mentioned before, it may be more challenging for users
to recognise claims as false when they contain elements of
truth, as this has found to be the case even for professional
fact-checkers [37]. It is still an open question whether there
is less partially false than false information circulating on
Twitter or whether fact checkers are more likely to debunk
completely false claims.
Fifthly, we recommend authorities to carefully tailor their
online responses. We found that for spreading fake news,
7This also applies the other way around: facts might be commented
ironically or deliberately provocative by using the tag #fakenews to create
confusion and to make trustworthy sources appear biased.
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emojis are used to appeal to the emotions. One the one hand,
you would rather expect a trusted source to have a neutral,
non-colloquial tone. On the other hand, it seems advise able
to get to the typical tone in social media, e.g. by also us-
ing emojis to some degree. We also advise authorities to
employ tools of social media analytics. This will help them
to keep updated on developing misinformation, as we found
that for example psycho-linguistic analysis can reveal partic-
ularities that differ in misinformation compared to the “usual
talk” on social media. Debunking fake news and keeping
information sovereignty is an arms race – using social me-
dia analytics to keep pace is therefore advisable. In fact, we
would recommend authorities to employ methods such as
the ones discussed in this paper as they work not only ex-
post but also during an ongoing infodemic. However, owed
to the limitation of data analysis and regarding API usage
(cf. with the prior and with the following section), we rec-
ommend making social media monitoring part of the com-
munication strategy, potentially also manually monitoring it.
This advise in general applies to all Twitter users: comment-
ing something is like shouting out loudly on a crowded street,
just that the street is potentially crowded by everyone on the
planet with Internet access. Whatever is tweeted might have
consequences that are unsought for.
Lastly, we recommend to work timely, yet calmly, and
with an eye for the latest developments. During our anal-
ysis, we encountered much bias – not only on Twitter, but
also on media and even in science. Topics such as the jus-
tification of lockdown measurement spark heated scientific
debate already, and offer much controversy. Traditional me-
dia, which supposedly should have well-trained science jour-
nalists, will cite vague and cautiously phrases ideas from sci-
entific preprints as seeming facts, ignoring that that ongoing
crisis mandates them to be accessable before peer review.
Acting cautiously onmisinformation will not only likely cre-
ate more misinformation, but it may erode trust. Our final
recommendation for officials is, thus, to be the trusty source
in an ocean of potential misinformation.
These recommendations must not be mistaken for a def-
initely guidelines let alone a handbook. They should offers
some initial aid, though. Moreover, formulating them sup-
ports the identification of research gaps, as will be discussed
along with the limitations in the following two subsections.
6.3. Limitations
Due to its character as complete yet early research, our
work is bound to several limitations. Firstly, we are aware
that there may be a selection bias in the collection of our
data set as we only consider rumours that were eventually
investigated by a fact-checking organisation. Thus, our data
probably excluded less viral rumours. Additionally, we lim-
ited our analysis to Twitter, based on prior research by [16]
that found that out of the mainstream media it was most sus-
ceptible to misinformation. Nonetheless, this does limit our
coverage of online COVID-19 misinformation.
We are also aware that we introduce another selection
bias through our data collection method, as we only include
rumours for which the fact-checking organisation refers to a
specific tweet id in its analysis of the claim. Furthermore, we
cannot be certain that this tweet id refers to the tweet spread-
ing misinformation, as it could also refer to a later tweet re-
futing this information or an earlier tweet spreading correct
information that was later re-purposed for spreading misin-
formation. Two examples of this are: (1) “Carnival in Bahia
- WHO WILL ? -URL-” which refers to a video showing
Carnival in Bahia but of which some claim it shows a gay
party in Italy shortly before the COVID-19 outbreak [2] and
(2) “ i leave a video of what happened yesterday 11/03 on a
bicentennial bank in merida . yes, these are notes.” which
is the correct information for a video from 2011 that was re-
purposed to wrongly claim that Italians were throwing cash
away during the corona crisis [13].
Second, our interpretation of both hashtag and emoji us-
age by authors of misinformation is limited by our lack of
knowledge of how the authors intended them. Both are cul-
turally and contextually bound, as well as influenced by age
and gender [27] and open to changes in their interpretation
over time [44].
However, none of these limitations impairs the original-
ity and novelty of our work; in fact, we gave first recommen-
dations for practitioners and are now able to propose direc-
tions for future research.
6.4. Open questions
On the one hand, work on misinformation in social me-
dia is no new emergence. On the other hand, the current cri-
sis has made it clear how harmful misinformation is. Obvi-
ously, strategies to mitigate the spread of misinformation are
needed. This leads to open research questions, particularly
in the light of the limitations of our work. Open questions
can be divided into four categories.
First, techniques, tools and theory from social media an-
alytics must be enhanced. It should become possible – ide-
ally in an half- or full-automated fashion – to assess the prop-
agation of misinformation. Understanding where misinfor-
mation originates, in which networks in circulates, how it is
spread, when it it debunked, and what the effects of debunk-
ing are ought to be researched in detail. As we already set out
in this paper, it would be ideal to provide as much discrimi-
natory power as possible, for example by distinguishing mis-
information that is completely and partly false; misinforma-
tion that is spread intentionally and by accident (maybe even
with good intention, but not knowing better); and misinfor-
mation that is shared only in silos versus misinformation that
leaves such silos and propagates further. Not only such a ty-
pology (maybe even taxonomy) would make a valuable con-
tribution to theory but also in-depth studies of the propa-
gation by type. Such insights would also aid fact checkers,
who would for example learn when it makes sense to debunk
facts, and whether there is a “break even” point after which
it is justified to invest the effort for debunking.
Second, since a holistic approach is necessary to effec-
tively tackle misinformation, it is important to investigate
how our results – and future results on the propagation of
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misinformation on Twitter – relate to other social media.
While Twitter is attractive for study and important for mis-
information due to the brevity and speed, other social me-
dia should also be researched. COVID-19 misinformation is
not necessarily restricted to a single platform and may thus
be spread from one platform to another. Consequently, fact-
checking organisation may not mention any tweets despite a
claim also being present on Twitter. Especially if the origin
of the claim was another platform there may be several seeds
on Twitter as people forward links from other platforms. As
part of this, the spread of fake news through closed groups
and messages would make an interesting object of study.
Third, the societal consequences of fake news ought to
be investigated. There is no doubt society is negatively im-
pacted, but to which extent these occur, whom they affect,
and how the offline spread of misinformation can be miti-
gated remain open research questions. Again, achieving high
discriminatory power would be much helpful to counter mis-
information. For example, it would be worthwhile to inves-
tigate how the diffusion of misinformation about COVID-19
differs per country.
In this regard, specifically the relation between trust and
misinformation is a topic that requires closer investigation.
In order for authorities to maintain information sovereignty,
users – in this case typically citizens – need to trust the au-
thorities. Such trust may vary widely from country to coun-
try. In general, a high level of trust, as achieved in the Nordic
countries [38, 5], should helpmitigatingmisinformation. Thus,
a better understanding of how authorities can gain and main-
tain a high level of trust could greatly benefit effective crisis
management.
Fourth, researching synergetically between the fields of
social media analytics and crisis management could benefit
both fields. On the one hand, social media analytics could
benefit from the expertise of crisis managers and researchers
in the field of crisis management in order to better interpret
their findings and to guide their research into worthwhile di-
rections. On the other hand, researchers in crisis manage-
ment could make use of novel findings on the propagation of
misinformation during crisis to improve their existing theo-
retical models in order to provide holistic approaches to in-
formation dissemination throughout the crisis. Crisis man-
agement in practice needs a set of guidelines. What we pro-
vided here is just a starting point; an extension requires addi-
tional quantitative and especially qualitative research as well
as validation by practitioners. Further collaboration of these
fields is necessary.
7. Conclusion
In this article we have presented work on COVID-19
misinformation on Twitter. We have analysed Tweets that
have been fact-checked by using techniques common to so-
cialmedia analytics. However, we decided for an exploratory
approach to cater for the unfolding crisis. While this bring
severe limitations with it, it also allowed us to gain insights
otherwise hardly possible. Therefore, we have presented rich
results, discussed our lessons learned, have first recommen-
dations for practitioners, and raised many open questions.
That there are so many questions – and thereby research gaps
– is not surprising, as the COVID-19 crisis is among few
stress-like disasters where misinformation is studied in de-
tail8 – and we are just at the beginning. Therefore, it was our
aspiration to contribute to a small degree to mitigating this
crisis.
We hope that our work can stimulate the discussion and
lead to discoveries from other researchers that make social
media a more reliable data source. Some of the questions
raised will also be on our future agendas. We intend to con-
tinue the very work of this paper, even though in a less ex-
ploratory fashion. Rather, we will seek to verify our early
findings quantitatively with much larger data sets. We will
seek collaboration with other partners to gain access to his-
torical Twitter data in order to investigate all replies and
retweets to the tweets on our corpus. This extension should
not only cover additional misinformation but also full sets
of replies and retweets. Moreover, it would be valuable to
longitudinally study how misinformation propagates as the
crisis develops. Regarding COVID-19, medical researchers
warn of the second wave [81], and maybe consecutive fur-
ther ones. Will misinformation also come in waves, possi-
bly in conjunction to societal discussion, political measure-
ments, or other influencing factors? Besides an extension
of the data set, our work will be extended methodologically.
For example, we seek to stance detection methods to deter-
mine the position of replies towards the claim. At the same
time, we would like to qualitatively explore the rationale be-
hind our observation.
Right as we concluded our work on this article, “doc-
tors, nurses and health expert [. . . ] sound the alarm” over a
“global infodemic, with viral misinformation on social me-
dia threatening lives around the world” [74]. They target
tech companies, specifically those that run social media plat-
forms. We take their letter as encouragement. The compa-
nies might be able to filter much more misinfomation than
they do now, but to battle this infodemicmuchmore is needed.
We hope we could help arming those that seek for truth!
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